silk road 2.0 shut down

[aldra]

Interesting comments from the (former) operator of Doxbin:

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007731.html

One hypothesis is that LE used DoS attacks to get the hidden service on a circuit of compromised nodes, then were able to deanonymize it somehow (traffic confirmation?). Can't quite wrap my head around this right now but I'll look into it more thoroughly after some rest.

thanks, interesting post.

a few messages down the chain he updates to say that the previous 'attack' was actually just someone crawling hidden services with a misconfigured script.... doesn't explain the traffic just before it went dark though. I'll keep reading along that track.

without a public LEO release, though (which will likely tell us nothing regardless) we can only really guess at what happened. how likely is it that they turned someone with access/connections to all 27 services, and that it wasn't a technical attack at all?

[Daran]

It's perhaps a good thing at the end of the day, only the most secured services will survive in the long run. The feds took down just 1/3 of the market this time, as opposed to the arguably 90% that silk road represented last year. All the SR2.0 vendors just moved to Agora anyway.